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The physical and political geography of the deserts of southwest Afghanistan have gone through 
dramatic change over the last two decades. Located on the periphery of irrigated lands settled 
by the Afghan state in the 1950s and 1960s, this area has been at the forefront of technical 
change in Afghan agricultural production since 2003. Initially settled by small numbers of house-
holds escaping drought in the 1990s, tracts of these former desert lands were captured by 
local elites and communities from the adjacent irrigated lands. Access to improved technologies, 
including deep wells and diesel pumps, and a buoyant opium price, led to dry rocky soils being 
transformed into agricultural land. Further encroachment of these former desert lands came 
in 2008 with the drive to curb opium production in those accessible irrigated areas where the 
Afghan state, and foreign military forces, coerced the rural population to abandon opium. These 
counternarcotics efforts evicted the land-poor from the centrally irrigated valleys of the prov-
inces of Helmand, Farah and Kandahar, leaving them few options but to seek new lives in the 
former desert areas. For those that owned land in the former desert areas, this supply of rela-
tively cheap labour, skilled in opium production, encouraged a further expansion in opium poppy 
cultivation. Even in the wake of repeated low yields between 2010 and 2014, and fluctuating 
opium prices, farmers in these former desert areas adapted and innovated, exploiting herbicides 
and solar-powered technology to reduce the costs of opium production, and further increased 
the amount of land under agriculture. As this paper argues, these former desert areas should 
not be seen as marginal and remote, far from the reaches of the development programs of the 
Afghan state and its donors, but understood as engines of growth integrated into the global 
economic system; these are areas that have been transformed by improved access to modern 
technologies and an entrepreneurial local population that has fully exploited the opportunities 
illegal opium production offers.
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1. Introduction
The deserts of southwest Afghanistan have changed dramatically over the last two decades. What was largely 
unsettled, bare land at the beginning of the twenty-first century had become home to up to 2.2 million 
people in 2016.1 What is more, this frontier area is located beyond the reaches of the Helmand and Farah 
rivers and the canal system that the Afghan state built in the twentieth century to increase the agricultural 
area from which it could extract rent. Yet in 2016, there were 472,838 hectares of agricultural land, where 
there had only been 254,866 in 2008 and 143,060 in 2003 (see Figure 1). This expansion did not occur 
through state intervention in the kind of large-scale irrigation works that had been seen in the past, but was 
 1 This is based on a minimum population density between 0.51 and 0.91 per jerib derived from fieldwork for this paper.
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the result of households capturing and purchasing what had once been designated ‘government land’ then 
investing in improved technologies. Over time, and with further encroachment, communities were formed 
across these former desert areas and distinct patterns of land tenure, systems of taxation and governance 
could be found. All this was achieved in areas where there had been nothing but sand and rocks twenty years 
before, and where the Afghan state had no formal presence.
This paper examines the processes that led to the settlement and transformation of this former desert 
land and shows that, were it not for illicit opium poppy, these developments would not have occurred. 
This paper is divided into five further sections. Section 2 outlines the methodology. It explains how com-
bining geospatial data with multiple rounds of fieldwork that focuses on household livelihood strategies 
provides a valuable and robust basis for examining illicit economies, particularly in remote and insecure 
locations. Section 3 describes how the geographic distribution of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan 
has emerged, consolidated and adapted to statebuilding and counternarcotics efforts. Section 4 focuses on 
the settlement of the former desert lands of the southwest. It uses the results of geospatial analysis and 
household interviews to chart the different patterns of settlement in the former deserts of Helmand and 
Bakwa and the various socio-economic groups involved. Section 5 examines the role of opium as a source 
and motivation for capital investment and how farmers have adapted to the continuing challenges of desert 
terrain, including high production costs, diminishing yields, and a falling water table. Section 6 concludes 
that while opium poppy has served as a lifeline to the burgeoning rural population in these former desert 
areas, the rapid adoption of solar power and chemical herbicides could threaten the long-term sustainability 
of agricultural production in these lands and support growing socio-economic differentiation in the com-
munities that live there.
2. Methodology
This paper is based on in-depth fieldwork and high-resolution imagery undertaken between 2011 and 2017 
in 20 research sites in two former desert areas (See Figure 2). Fieldwork consisted of 1,078 interviews with 
rural households and supplementary data collection among those providing services to these desert com-
munities. In total, 742 interviews were conducted with farmers in 8 research sites in the area north of the 
Boghra canal in Helmand Province and 336 interviews with farmers in 12 research sites in Bakwa in Farah 
Figure 1: The expansion of land under agricultural production in the deserts of the southwest, 2002–2016.
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Province.2 A further 40 interviews were conducted with individuals involved in the provision of services to 
the population in the former desert areas in the cities of Lashkar Gah, Gereshk, Farah and Delarem, includ-
ing those trading solar panels, diesel, pesticides and the leasing of drilling equipment for sinking deep wells.
High-resolution remote sensing imagery was integral to the research design. Geospatial data on vege-
tation was combined with high resolution imagery to examine the history of settlement in the former 
desert area. Research sites were then identified based on the duration of settlement, ranging from sites that 
showed evidence of agricultural production prior to 2003 to those settled in 2013. Remote sensing imagery 
was then used to verify that fieldworkers had been to the identified sites, and thenthe results of primary data 
collection were examined. High-resolution imagery allowed further exploration of primary research findings 
including the identification of crops under cultivation as well as new or damaged physical infrastructure, 
and the measurement of changes in the area under cultivation. Finally, geospatial analysis supported the 
extrapolation of research findings over a wider geographic beyond the research sites themselves.
Fieldwork was undertaken by a team of local researchers. The research addressed the inherent problems 
associated with primary data collection when researching an illegal or underground activity by focusing 
its inquiry on household livelihood strategies. The pressure to act against opium cultivation and trade has 
made illicit drugs a more sensitive topic for discussion with farmers and other stakeholders than was the 
case in the 1990s and early 2000s (Mansfield 2016). However, the rural household remains the most accessi-
ble unit of analysis when looking at the opium economy in Afghanistan; it offers a basis for cross-referencing 
findings both with other work on rural livelihoods in Afghanistan, and with other research on the specific 
role of opium production in rural livelihood strategies in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Discussions in the 
field focused on the direct experience of respondents and their households rather than on a wider geo-
graphic area, where answers become increasingly speculative (Swedish Committee of Afghanistan, 1992: 1). 
Individual interviews with farming households were conducted in the field as farmers tended their crops, 
 2 The research in the former desert areas was also supported by longitudinal fieldwork in 12 sites in the main canal irrigated area 
of Helmand where many of those that have settled north of the Boghra originate from. The results of this work can be found in a 
number of other publications including most recently, “Truly Unprecedented: How the Helmand Food Zone supported an increase 
in the province’s capacity to produce opium” by David Mansfield, AREU, October 2017.
Figure 2: Research sites in the deserts of Southwest Afghanistan. 
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since holding interviews in the household compound can attract attention from others and become sub-
ject to repeated interruptions and biases. Group discussions with farmers were avoided, as they: tend to be 
dominated by community elites; are inappropriate for discussing sensitive issues; increasingly represent a 
security threat in rural Afghanistan, particularly in the south (Mansfield 2016).
3. Changing patterns of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan
3.1. The emergence of widespread poppy cultivation
Although opium poppy cultivation is thought to have a long history in Afghanistan, there is little evidence 
of significant production until the 1980s (Macdonald, 2007: 59), marked by the Iranian Revolution, the 
proclamation of the Hadd ordinance banning opium production in Pakistan, and—most importantly—the 
civil war in Afghanistan. During the war years, Afghanistan emerged as global leader in opium production, 
based on what Goodhand (2012) has referred to as a ‘triple comparative advantage of favourable physical, 
political and economic conditions.’ This growth in cultivation can be linked to the political and economic 
interests of warlords who built patronage networks by taxing cultivation and, in some cases, participating 
directly in the trade.
Opium production became an ideal agricultural commodity during the war years, in the absence of a func-
tioning state that could either support growth in the legal rural economy or use law enforcement to con-
strain cultivation. As a drought-resistant crop, a yield could be obtained despite damaged irrigation systems 
or inconsistent water supply; as a high-value/low-weight commodity, opium could be easily transported on 
poor roads or across porous borders. Skills involved in cultivation were easily learned and harvesting tools 
could be produced by local craftsmen or by farmers themselves. Market support was provided by local trad-
ers, avoiding long-range transport and transaction costs. Finally, during the war the use of opium increased 
significantly in Afghanistan and among the Afghan diaspora in Pakistan and Iran, thereby increasing the 
demand for opium production (Macdonald 2007).
As opium cultivation expanded from the higher valleys into larger landholdings in lower areas, its role in 
rural livelihoods and in the overall economy began to grow. The expansion of the crop meant that landown-
ing households which did not meet the labour requirements could offer land on a sharecropping basis to 
land-poor, underemployed males. This practice led to a symbiotic relationship between the landed and the 
land-poor, fuelling socio-economic differentiation between and within rural areas.
Opium gave the land-poor access to land on which to grow a high-value cash crop and food crops, and to 
engage in the system of advance purchases on opium that provided liquidity for households during periods 
of food scarcity, family illness, or life-cycle events such as births, marriages or deaths. Opium poppy also pro-
vided wage labour for those who could travel to neighbouring districts during the labour-intensive harvest 
period.
The multiplier effect created further economic opportunities through the service industries associated 
with the cultivation, trade and processing of opiates, as well as the resulting disposable income, some of 
which was reinvested in the local economy. Those with capital and access to the means of violence benefited 
from asset accumulation and political and military influence.
Given its widespread economic and social benefits, little was done to contain the opium economy during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Drug control efforts were rare and were largely for show, aimed at encouraging an 
increase in development assistance from foreign sponsors (Mansfield, 2002). There are considerable doubts 
as to the effectiveness of campaigns, due to the challenges of estimating levels of cultivation and questions 
about territorial control (Martin 2014).
These earlier efforts at drug control offered only temporary lulls in production across limited geographic 
areas. They disrupted political arrangements with local commanders and possibly with drug traders and pro-
cessors, and appear to have yielded little of the donor assistance and patronage that regional commanders 
were looking for.
3.2. Consolidation during the Taliban years
The Taliban’s arrival in the southern provinces in 1994 did nothing to stop the growth in opium (see 
Figure 3). In fact, under their rule cultivation expanded significantly, facilitated by the removal of check-
points and militias along the major roads and driven by limited economic opportunities in the legal rural 
economy (UNDCP, 1998a). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that the level of cultiva-
tion rose from 18,500 hectares in 1987 (US Department of State, 1997) to 91,000 hectares in 1999.
During the 1990s, opium expanded beyond its traditional centres of production in the South, East and 
Northeast to parts of the North and Centre and more districts in the Eastern Region (UNDCP 1998a). Those 
households with insufficient land in the core production areas sent family members to other provinces 
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where they had ethnic or familial ties. There they leased or sharecropped land, sharing their skills in opium 
production with the local population (UNDCP, 1998a, 1999). Then these itinerant harvesters returned to 
their own land and applied their new skills (UNDCP, 1998a).
There was also growing experimentation by farmers who attempted to cultivate opium poppy for the first 
time, limiting production to small plots of land situated among crops like wheat and onion in case their 
poppy failed (UNDCP, 1998a). The proactive role of the rural population expanding cultivation, combined 
with what Byrd (2008: 17) has referred to as the ‘footloose’ nature of the drugs economy, points to the 
degree of autonomy in rural areas and the economic opportunities that opium offered a wide range of actors 
(Mansfield 2016).
During the Taliban’s rule, the opium trade became consolidated within the Afghan economy. Before the 
ban in July 2000, the Taliban did little to hamper production or trade, beyond a few flurries of activity at 
the behest of the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP): closing some laboratories, small-scale eradication, 
proclamations prohibiting opium production (Mansfield 2016). Opium was dried and traded on the streets 
of district bazaars, close to the highway. Marketing hubs in the East and South proliferated and moved closer 
to the arterial roads (UNDCP, 1998b). Finally, heroin processing facilities were found in the main valleys, 
often near the district centre where Taliban soldiers were located.
Some viewed this expansion, coinciding with the Taliban’s territorial gains, as evidence of the Taliban’s 
control of the trade. But the relationship was more complex, reflecting local political settlements and bar-
gains. In some cases, local Taliban leadership tolerated drug production and trade, unwilling to challenge 
powerful local interests. In others, Taliban commanders were actively involved in opiate trade and taxation.
These local arrangements came undone with the imposition of the Taliban ban in July 2000. After 
numerous requests by the UN and international donors to act against the drugs trade, the Taliban imposed 
an effective ban on opium production in the 2000–01 growing season, reducing cultivation from 82,000 
hectares in 2000 to 8,000 hectares in 2001 (see Figure 2). Although UN officials billed it as ‘one of the most 
remarkable [drug control] successes ever’ (cited in Jelsma, 2005: 1), it was an event that many would come 
to regret.
For the Taliban, the ban imposed hardships on the rural population that enabled Western military forces 
to encourage rebellion against the regime (UNODC, 2003; Mansfield, 2004). For the Interim Administration 
and its successor, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, cessation of production led to 
a rapid rise in the price of opium that made cultivation profitable even in marginal areas. Combined with 
the return of the mujahidin leadership to provinces they had presided over in the 1980s and 1990s, opium 
became a mainstay of the Afghan economy and a metric by which both the Afghan government and the 
international project in Afghanistan came to be judged (Mansfield 2016).
3.3. Expansion and shifting patterns of cultivation under the statebuilding project
Giustozzi (2007: 9) argues that for political entrepreneurs the drugs economy became a source of power 
during the initial years of the Karzai regime. Members of Parliament, government ministers, regional power 
brokers and elements of the security apparatus were thought to be directly involved in the drugs trade or 
to have received payments for their role as ‘security providers’ (Mankin, 2009). Byrd and Jonglez (2006) 
Figure 3: Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 1987–2017 (hectares).
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reported growing market integration, while others claimed that trafficking had become concentrated in 
the hands of a few key individuals, many with close links to the Ministry of Interior (Buddenberg and Byrd, 
2006: 201).
Evidence of market concentration was less obvious in the provinces following the Taliban’s collapse in 
2001. In fact, cultivation expanded significantly in areas with few pre-existing market linkages and limited 
production experience (Mansfield, 2006). This was prompted by the fact that high prices were sustained 
following the collapse of the ban and the launch of counternarcotics efforts. Increased cultivation was also 
seen in the traditional areas of production as farmers took advantage of high prices and the absence of 
government control to make up for the loss of income and rising debts that many had incurred under the 
Taliban ban (UNODC, 2003; Mansfield, 2004). By 2004, opium poppy could be found in 194 out of 364 
districts and in all 34 provinces, compared to only 54 districts in eight provinces in 1994 (UNODC/MCN, 
2004).
After 2005, national opium poppy cultivation fluctuated widely, falling between 2008 and 2010, only to 
rise again in 2011. However, aggregate levels mask regional, provincial and district-level variations. Dramatic 
reductions in Helmand and Nangarhar provinces had a significant impact on aggregate statistics: a fact that 
helped meet the demand of the UK and US governments.
Counternarcotics efforts are one factor in these reductions. Cultivation fell significantly in Nangarhar—a 
province that had been second only to Helmand as a major producer of opium—after the imposition of bans 
by two governors. The most striking example is Helmand itself where the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ) was 
introduced in 2008. With financial and logistical backing from the UK and US governments, this initiative 
consisted of three activities: a counternarcotics information campaign aimed at deterring planting, distribu-
tion of wheat seed and fertiliser, and eradication (Mansfield et al., 2011). Within the HFZ, cultivation in 2009 
fell from 103,590 to 69,833 hectares (see Figure 4). By the spring of 2011, there was a 40% reduction in 
cultivation compared to the 2007–08 growing season (UNODC/MCN, 2012).
A second factor in the downward trend in cultivation in 2008 and 2009 was the shift in terms of trade 
between wheat and opium (Mansfield et al., 2011; Mansfield and Pain, 2008). The rapid rise in world cereal 
prices in late 2007, combined with insecurity in Pakistan following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, 
restricted cross-border trade in Pakistani wheat flour and led to higher wheat prices in Afghanistan. And high 
levels of opium production between 2002 and 2007 led to opium prices falling from US$700/kilogramme 
in September 2001 to less than US$60/kilogramme in the 2007–08 growing season (Mansfield and Pain, 
2008: 14).
With this shift in prices, farmers across Afghanistan became increasingly concerned about food security; 
many opted to cultivate wheat rather than cash crops. In the less fertile areas where opium had little tra-
dition and the population lacked experience and skills, farmers realised that they could produce wheat 
on their own land rather than using opium profits to purchase wheat. Under these conditions, farmers 
did not need to be coerced to abandon opium production, although this did not stop the political leader-
ship or counternarcotics community from taking credit for reduced cultivation (Mansfield and Pain, 2008; 
UNODC/MCN, 2008: 2).
Figure 4: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Helmand, 2001–2017 (hectares).
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A third factor in reductions during this period was the growth of opportunities in the legal economy, par-
ticularly in the lower valleys where most development assistance had been provided. The World Bank esti-
mated that between 2002 and 2012, US$55 billion of aid was given to Afghanistan, and the average annual 
growth rate in gross domestic product was 9% (cited in Goodhand, 2012). Major poppy-growing provinces 
like Helmand received an estimated US$600 million of development assistance between 2009 and 2011, the 
years in which the Helmand Food Zone was implemented (USAID, 2014: 29).
Even as early as 2008, the areas around provincial centres in most opium-growing provinces showed 
increasing signs of agricultural diversification and more complex cropping systems that included high-value, 
short-season horticultural crops and the cultivation of a variety of crops on a single unit of land. This allowed 
farmers to better manage the risk of crop failure and increase on-farm income (Mansfield and Pain, 2008; 
Mansfield, 2008). Households in these areas exploited wage-labour opportunities in the service sector and 
construction industry, further diversifying their income base.
A fourth reason for falling levels of cultivation was the rollout of national and international security forces 
to the regions. From 2004 on, communities began to mobilise through the establishment of Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). By 2008, the perceived failures of centralised statebuilding, the growing insur-
gency and the new counter-insurgency doctrine led to a shift towards bottom-up state building and devo-
lution to the districts. A typical trajectory was for opium cultivation to fall in areas around the provincial 
centres. In provinces like Helmand where military presence extended into the districts, production was 
also deterred. The impact of military operations on levels of cultivation was most stark in Marjah District in 
Helmand Province where, following the deployment of 15,000 US Marines and the Afghan National Defense 
and Security Forces (ANDSF) in February 2010, the amount of land dedicated to opium poppy fell from 60% 
to less than 5% the following season (Mansfield, 2012: 3).
The combination of these factors—provincial drug control efforts, the shift in terms of trade between 
wheat and poppy, the uptake in economic opportunities within the legal economy and the deployment of 
military forces to key provinces—led to reduced opium production, even in provinces where the crop had a 
long history and was most concentrated. While initially lauded as the success of counternarcotics interven-
tions and the statebuilding effort, reduced cultivation in some provinces in the south and southwest were 
offset by dramatic increases in production in more remote desert areas within the same provinces—areas 
that had not been under opium poppy cultivation before or, indeed, under any kind of agricultural produc-
tion. The following section examines the expansion into two desert areas, Helmand and Bakwa, and shows 
how existing patterns of land ownership in the irrigated areas, and interventions by the state, affected the 
settlement of these lands and led to a number of provinces with desert frontiers increasing their capacity to 
produce more opium than ever before (Mansfield 2017).
4. Settlement of the desert lands
This section traces the structural factors that have shaped the settlement of two desert spaces. The first is 
the area north of the Bogra canal, in Helmand province, southwestern Afghanistan. The Boghra canal is the 
primary artery of a major Afghan government infrastructural program funded by international donors, pri-
marily the US government, in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. This intervention brought thousands of hectares 
of land under irrigation, much of it in the districts of Nad-e Ali and Marjah where around 5,500 families were 
settled from different parts of Afghanistan (Dupree, 1997: 499–507). The initial settlement of the former 
desert areas north of the Boghra canal did not begin until the 1990s. At this stage encroachment was limited 
to a small number of households from Washir who left their villages to escape the drought. It was not until 
after the collapse of the Taliban government in late 2001 that larger numbers of families began to move into 
the former desert areas north of the Boghra, facilitated by the weak central government in Kabul and rise of 
powerful local actors who captured the land and distributed it through their patronage networks. By 2016 
there were over 45,000 hectares of agricultural land in the lands to the north of the Boghra canal and south 
of Highway 1, with much of the land being improved, commoditized and traded. An area that consisted of a 
few scattered settlements and rudimentary farms a decade earlier, had become a place of innovation, vibrant 
development and home to over 200,000 people.3
The second desert area is in Bakwa, some 120 km to the northwest of the Boghra, where a similar pro-
cess of agricultural transformation had occurred. Considered locally as ‘the same desert’, this former barren 
land straddles the border of the provinces of Farah and Nimroz and is dominated by the Bahadarzai and 
 3 This estimate is based on a population density of 0.9 persons per jeribs of cultivated land.
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Chalakzai tribes of the Noorzai. Originally, the population was found in 13 villages fed by an estimated 360 
underground water systems known as karez (Goes et al., 2017). However, in the 1990s the area began to 
transform as more and more farmers moved from their original village lands out into the desert, driven by 
the drought that beset the southwest region during much of the decade and was at its most acute between 
1998 and 2002. By 2016, there were 125,462 hectares of land under agricultural production in Bakwa, up 
from 21,089 hectares in 2003. Over the same period the population had increased by from an estimated 
53,788 to 319,928 people.4
4.1. Patronage, sales and rent
The transformation of the former desert lands north of the Boghra and Bakwa have been molded by patterns 
of land ownership in the irrigated lands in the nearby irrigated lands. While desert land in the southwest, 
and elsewhere, is officially government land, and over time has become a commodity to be bought and sold, 
the capacity to own and develop former desert lands is largely a function of force, underwritten by claims of 
tradition. It is not an open and unrestricted market where anyone with the ability to pay can purchase land 
and use it as they see fit.
In the case of the area north of the Boghra, settlement has been shaped by the dominant southern tribes of 
the canal irrigated areas of central Helmand. These tribes have gained almost sole access to the former desert 
lands, to the exclusion of those tribal groups from others parts of the country who were settled in central 
Helmand—known locally as the naqel—during the state sponsored irrigation project of the 1950s to 1970s. 
For example, of those interviewed, 95% were from the Barakzai, Ishaqzai, Noorzai, Alizai, Alkozai, compared 
to only 5% from minor tribes such as the Sulemankhel, Kharoti and Taimani (Mansfield, 2014: 49).
This concentration of land ownership amongst those who are considered locally as indigenous, is a func-
tion of the initial wave of land grabs that took place after the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001. Following 
the collapse of the Taliban regime the land north of the Boghra was captured by politico-military actors and 
their supporters in the villages located on the southern banks of the canal. Many of these actors were associ-
ated with the then provincial governor Sher Mohammed Akhunzade and the Karzai administration in Kabul. 
Once captured by powerful commanders the desert lands were then distributed to their family, friends 
and military subordinates. Thus in the initial years of settlement many desert areas were dominated by the 
particular tribal group of the commander who had initially captured the land. For example, in Shna Jama, 
an area taken by Haji Tahir, a Noorzai and former security commander in Nad e Ali, 65 percent of farmers 
were Noorzai. In Dashte Ab Pashak 61.5 percent of farmers were Barakzai. This was an area that was initially 
grabbed by Hajji Abdul Qadoos, a former commander of Moallem Mirwali of the 93rd division of the Afghan 
National Army and Member of Parliament. Both strongmen were Barakzai (Mansfield, 2014: 49).
Over time the former desert land north of the Boghra was commoditized and sold on. Some of the land 
was improved; it was cleared of stones, fertilized, a house was built and the all important deep well was 
sunk. Land prices began low at the equivalent of US$400 to US$1200 per hectare until as late as 2007, 
but as the model of encroachment and land improvement proved successful, and more farmers began to 
leave the irrigated canal area, prices rose, reaching as much as US$2,000 PR per hectare in 2011 (Mansfield, 
2014: 50). By late 2016 land prices north of the Boghra had reached as high as US$3,835 to US$7,190 per 
hectare depending on the location, with the highest prices paid for land nearest to the Boghra canal, the 
irrigated lands on the southern bank, and ease of access to the public and private sector services in the city 
of Lashkar Gah.
However, the market for land north of the Boghra remains restricted. Even in 2017 it is the indigenous 
tribes of Helmand that still dominate land ownership, tenancy and sharecropping arrangements. Access 
continues to be structured around familial and tribal links, and the numbers of naqel households in the 
former desert areas is limited to a few isolated sharecropping families.
Patterns of land ownership in Bakwa have also been dominated by those considered indigenous to the 
area. In Bakwa, the original settlers were the Noorzai villages and it is the Noorzai that continues to domi-
nate land ownership in the desert lands, making up over 98 percent of those interviewed during fieldwork.
In contrast to the iterative process of moving further north of the Boghra canal as seen in Helmand, it is 
the original karez irrigated villages that are the focal point for expansion into the desert lands of Bakwa. In 
Bakwa the population of each village moved into the desert lands that surround them, absorbing land some 
distance from the epicenter of their original village. Within each village this newly acquired desert land was 
 4 This estimate is based on a population density of 0.51 persons per jeribs of cultivated land.
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distributed according to local traditions, with the amount of land allocated to each household determined 
by the proportion of land they owned in the original karez irrigated village. Thus a household with 5 jeribs 
of land in the original karez irrigated village of 400 jeribs would get as much as 70 jeribs of the 5,600 jeribs 
of desert land that the village had absorbed. With thousands of jeribs of desert land available, and no govern-
ment able to prevent the incursions, these settlers often received as much as 80 of 100 jeribs of land to be 
divided amongst their family.
Those who initially settled in this desert space looked to find ways to fund the drilling and establishment 
of deep wells that would bring their newly acquired land under agricultural production. Some sold parcels of 
their land to migrants from other parts of the south, including from other districts of Farah, such as Gulistan, 
Bala Bulok and Shindand. Known for its quality soil, and facing both population pressures and a shortage of 
land in their home villages, a number of farmers came to the area from these districts seeking a better quality 
of life. These initial land sales helped finance the capital required to bring new land under cultivation, which 
in turn produced opium that could be then sold and the money earned reinvested to bring further land 
under agricultural production. It is claimed that through this process some of the original settlers have 
acquired as many as three or four deep wells, each of which irrigates between 15 to 20 jeribs of land.
As in Helmand all of those that have migrated to Bakwa on both a permanent and temporary basis 
have pre-existing contacts in the area and the vast majority are from tribes indigenous to the southwest 
of Afghanistan. All are bound to the area by family or friends. Most of those working as tenant farmers or 
sharecroppers came to Bakwa because they did not have any land, or sufficient land in their own village. 
They came to the area looking to escape the conflict in northern Helmand and in other parts of Farah, 
particularly Gulistan. A sizable population arrived in Bakwa in 2006 and 2007 from the district of Farah, all 
looking for land in direct response to the imposition of an opium ban in those areas around the provincial 
centre (see Figure 5). A further wave came between 2010 and 2012 from central Helmand, districts such 
as Nad e Ali, and Marjah, escaping the impact of the opium poppy ban imposed by the government. Only 
a minority came from more distant provinces such as Ghazni and Wardak, but even these had existing con-
tacts in the area, initially working as skilled labourers building mud brick houses before obtaining land to 
cultivate opium poppy.
As opposed to the area north of the Boghra canal, land in Bakwa has5not been commoditized and sold on 
a large scale. In fact, after an initial flurry of sales to help finance the development of their own land, the 
original Noorzai settlers looked to retain ownership within the tribe. Instead of selling land, the Noorzai 
landowners hired tenant farmers and sharecroppers. These individuals offered a cheap and skilled labour 
force, improved the land through their toil, and in some cases provided the capital investments required to 
bring the land permanently under cultivation. This labour force has been critical to the transformation of 
these former desert lands.
 5 This chart does not include all 336 respondents in Bakwa because many (n = 79) did not offer a year of settlement. These respond-
ents cited that they were ‘from this village’ and ‘had always lived there’, reflecting the local claim that the desert land that 
surrounded the original karez irrigated village had always belonged to them.
Figure 5: Year of settlement in Bakwa, by land tenure (n = 257)5.
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4.2. Access to a cheap and skilled labour force
The encroachment and land grabs that followed the collapse of formal government in southwestern Afghan-
istan did not allow for these former deserts areas to be transformed into productive land immediately. 
Agricultural production in these areas is capital intensive and requires deep wells costing as between US$ 
2,000 and US$ 5,000. The opium crop opium crop that dominates the landscape, and is the only viable crop 
given the costs of transforming this desert land into agriculture, is labour intensive requiring up to 360 
person days per hectare. As such both capital and labour are required.
In Bakwa, the concentration of land ownership amongst the Noorzai, and the amount of land owned by 
the original settlers, constrained agricultural production in the early years of settlement of the desert land. 
To overcome this problem land tenancy arrangements adapted to support investment in the former desert 
area. The mechanism to do this was the lekha, a five year rental agreement under which a tenant farmer pays 
the annual costs of production but pays the landowner only 1/6th or 1/7th of the final crop. Under this 
arrangement the landowner is only responsible for providing a deep-well and generator at the start of the 
tenancy. It is the tenant that is responsible for clearing the land, levelling it, improving the soils and making 
the farm a productive enterprise. At the end of tenancy, the tenant is required to ensure that the deep well 
is still operating.
It is an arrangement that can be mutually convenient to both sides. For what is typically a land poor ten-
ant farmer, the lekha provides access to land on which they can grow both food and cash crops, obtain water 
for their family and livestock, a home, and an agricultural income that is, in most years, higher than the cost 
of production. Meanwhile, the landowner obtain a relatively small income for 5 years but at the end of the 
arrangement receives a fully productive farm on which a sharecropper can then be employed for only 1/5 
of the final opium crop.
North of the Boghra in Helmand, the lekha tenancy arrangement is rarely recorded, a function of smaller 
landholdings and a relative abundance of cheap labour in the area. Here, sharecropping has provided a rela-
tively cheap labour force to those landowners with sufficient capital, offering them 4/5 of the final opium 
crop, compared to only 2/3 in the canal irrigated areas of the Helmand canal.
In particular, those owning desert lands north of the Boghra have benefited from government and donor 
backed interventions in the canal irrigated area of Helmand, most notably the Helmand Food Zone. After 
all, it was the Helmand Food Zone—a counternarcotics effort funded by the UK and US governments—with 
its emphasis on extension of wheat that compelled a large number of the land-poor to leave the canal area 
after 2008 (see Figure 6). Unable to find land in the canal command area once the more labour intensive 
opium poppy was banned, these farmers and their families settled in the desert lands north of the Boghra 
Canal where there was a demand for their services as sharecroppers and tenant farmers. Desperate for land, 
they accepted a smaller share of the final opium crop than they had when they cultivated opium in the canal 
command area before the ban was imposed (Mansfield 2014, 51). 
This influx of cheap and relatively skilled labour provided an impetus for increasing both the amount of 
land under agriculture and the percentage dedicated to opium poppy. As such, between 2008 and 2012 the 
Figure 6: Year of settlement in area north of Boghra, by land tenure (n = 742).
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amount of land under agriculture north of the Boghra canal more than doubled, the vast majority of which 
was cultivated with opium poppy (see Figure 7).
5. The role of capital in transforming deserts into flowers
Transformation of the desert lands of the southwest has required the acquisition of land and labour, but it 
has also needed the funds for capital investment. Illegal opium has been the source of this capital: it has 
paid for the initial investment in the deep wells that have been critical for bringing the former desert lands 
under agriculture, for the recurrent costs of running these wells, and for subsequent innovation to cope 
with successive years of falling yields. Without illegal opium these lands would have remained barren and 
the innovation that has been instrumental in transforming these desert lands and settling the population 
would not have occurred.
5.1. Illicit opium as a source of investment
It is notable that in the 1990s the desert lands of southwest Afghanistan saw little encroachment. While 
shallow well technology was available and being used in the drier parts of the canal irrigated areas of Panjwai 
and Zahre in Kandahar province in the late 1990s, settlement in the deserts of Bakwa and north of the 
Boghra was limited to all but a few isolated families. One of the reasons for this was the low price of opium 
in the 1990s, rarely exceeding US$30 per kilogram. It was not until after the Taliban opium ban in 2000–01, 
and the persistence of high opium prices until 2004, that the conversion of these desert areas into agri-
cultural land became a worthwhile proposition. At prices of more than US$200 per kilogram it was opium 
that paid for the initial investments in land—the shallow wells—and subsequently the deep-well technology, 
without which the land would not continue to be cultivated.
In Bakwa, shallow wells were first dug in response to repeated crop failure in the karez irrigated areas, 
caused by the drought that began in southwest Afghanistan in 1996. At the peak there was an estimated 
5,000 shallow-wells in the Bakwa area alone. Locally, farmers argue that it was these wells that drove 
down the water table further, drying up the karez completely, and rendering the water supply unreli-
able. However, while the sinking of shallow wells supported continued agricultural production in the 
original settled villages of Bakwa, and some expansion into desert space, it is the introduction of deep well 
Figure 7: Increase in agricultural land, north of Boghra, Helmand 2003–2016.
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technology that facilitated the dramatic encroachment of desert lands of southwestern Afghanistan over 
the last decade. Locally, farmers report that this technology came from Pakistan in the early part of the 21st 
century, brought in by both Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and a rural population with knowl-
edge of the equipment—the percussion drills, water pumps, and generators—from their time as refugees 
in Balochistan.
Sinking these deep wells was not cheap and required start-up capital, as well as the necessary income to 
meet recurrent costs. In Bakwa the wells are particularly deep, ranging from 100 to 120 metres, in some 
areas almost twice the depth of those in the former desert areas north of the Boghra. Establishing a diesel 
powered deepwell typically costs US$1,700 and can irrigate up to 20 jeribs of land (Mansfield and Fishstein, 
2016: 20). Recurrent costs would not only include the cost of diesel but also the repair and replacement of 
the water pump, generator and pipes that would may only last up to 2 years. As such recurrent costs could 
be as high as US$1,000 per year for these items alone (Mansfield, 2014: 49).
Therefore even after the initial investment has been made in sinking the well and purchasing the associ-
ated equipment, agricultural production in the former desert areas remains expensive. There is no other 
crop that has been able to meet these costs of production in these former desert areas. Historical crop 
mapping north of the Boghra shows just how prevalent opium poppy cultivation is, typically occupying the 
majority of land under agriculture each year (see Figure 8).
However, since 2013 the profitability of opium poppy has been under threat. Consistent low yields due to 
disease, along with a doubling of the price of diesel in 2014, have led to some farmers experiencing losses 
(Mansfield and Fishstein, 2016: 28). Farmers have been compelled to respond. Some, particularly sharecrop-
pers and tenants, have sought to relocate, hoping that they might find land back in the canal irrigated areas 
where opium poppy has returned following the departure of foreign military forces. Others—most notably 
the landed—have invested in new technologies, looking to reduce the recurrent costs of opium production 
and thereby return to economic viability.
5.2. Adaptation, innovation and change
The incursion into former desert lands has been supported by significant technological innovation in agri-
cultural production. Shallow wells were replaced by deep wells, and more recently there has been a move to 
substitute diesel powered pumps and generators with integrated solar systems. The use of herbicides and 
pesticides—although not exclusive to the former desert areas in the southwest—has also supported more 
extensive opium poppy cultivation.
The uptake of solar power has been dramatic and is likely to have a significant already effect on the socio-
economic composition of those that have settled in the former desert areas, as well as on the environment. 
What was initially only a source of lighting for the household has quickly become a major source of power 
for both the home and the farm. In the fall of 2013, research in the former desert areas of Bakwa, Helmand 
Figure 8: Crop mapping in Shna Jama, north of the Boghra, Helmand, 2008–2017.
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and Kandahar revealed only a handful of solar powered deepwells. However, by the spring of 2017, there 
were over 25,000 solar powered systems in the southwest alone (see Figure 9), and in Bakwa 68% of those 
interviewed had solar powered deepwells.
In part, the rapid uptake of solar technology was due to the availability of improved Chinese technology. 
The price of solar panels has fallen by more than half in the last four years alone.6 There was also a prolif-
eration of outlets selling solar powered systems, as what were once more remote parts of Afghanistan have 
been more closely integrated into markets through improvements in roads, communications and transport. 
While in 2013 farmers in Helmand and Bakwa had to travel to Kandahar city to purchase solar technology, 
‘now traders are selling it in the village’. There are even support services in the form of experienced engi-
neers to install the solar system. Once installed there are much lower recurrent costs and fewer maintenance 
problems than with diesel powered deep wells.
When solar was first introduced farmers would use as many as sixty of the smaller 150 Amp (1.5 metre) 
panels to power their deepwells. By 2016 much larger panels were being used, typically 300 Amp (2.5 
metre). Thirty of these panels generate more power and allow a greater amount of water to be pumped, an 
advantage given the falling water table. Further innovations can be seen in the way that the solar panels 
are mounted. Once positioned loosely on the roof of the house, five or six large panels are now set in metal 
frames. Some of these frames can be rotated to allow farmers to position their solar panels to best exploit 
the sunlight over the course of a day. More recently, improvement in technology have led to integrated 
systems, including the ability to store solar power in batteries, making solar a more attractive and reliable 
energy source than before. The result is after an initial outlay of around US$5,000, solar technology can be 
used with very few recurrent costs (see Table 1).
 6 This is based on a price of 8,000 Afs for a 150 Amp solar panel in Bakwa in 2013, compared with 7,500 Afs for a 300 Amp solar 
panel in May 2017.
Figure 9: Increase in the number of reservoirs (and associated solar powered deepwells) in the deserts of 
southwest Afghanistan, 2016–2017.
Table 1: Cost of installation of a solar powered deepwell in Helmand in 2017.
Item Price (PR)/Unit Number of Units Total (PR) Total (USD)
Water Pump 45,000 1 45,000 410
Plastic Pipes 220 PR/metre 30 6,600 60
Transformer 22,000 1 22,000 200
Solar Panels (300 Amp) 14,000 30 420,000 3,818
Electric Wire 3,000/bundle 2 6,000 55
Frame 8,000 5 40,000 364
Installation 6,000 1 6,000 55
Total 547,600 4,960
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While improvements in technology and availability have supported farmers to innovate, the pressure to 
adopt new technologies has been driven by the growing environmental and economic challenges of farming 
in these former desert areas since 2013, in particular by fluctuations in the price of diesel, the lowering of 
the water table and opium yields. These factors led farmers to look for ways to reduce the risks of making 
a loss on their opium crop during what appears to be fairly regular bouts of disease and crop failure. For 
example, farmers in Bakwa reported they had not had a good opium crop since 2011 and that the harvest 
in 2017 had resulted in yields as low as 2.5 kg per hectare. In the former desert area of Helmand farmers 
experienced four consecutive years of poor crops since 2012, with yields of less than 11.25 kg per hectare in 
2015. It wasn’t until 2016 that the opium crop recovered, with yields of 22.5 to 45 kg per hectare, followed 
by what many farmers considered a ‘good year’ in 2017 of up to 67.5 kg per hectare.
A further innovation in the cultivation of opium poppy in the deserts of the southwest has been the 
adoption of herbicides. By 2017 herbicides were almost universally used on the opium crop in Helmand 
and Bakwa, whereas in 2013 farmers were just experimenting with these products. Here, too, there were 
rapid developments. Initially farmers used broad-based herbicides—products like paraqat and 2,4 D—and 
had to cover the individual plants they wished to keep with soil, or with the lid of the herbicide bottle. These 
herbicides were known locally as ‘pata dawar’ and were produced in Iran, Pakistan and China. By 2015, crop 
specific herbicides were more common. These were products like Topik that does not kill broad leafed crops 
like opium poppy and therefore does not require farmers to cover the individual plants that were to be 
retained. These products known collectively as ‘loosah dawar’ typically came from China and greatly reduced 
the preparation time required for weeding.
Pesticides were also introduced in 2016 and farmers report that ‘each year a new chemical arrives on the 
market’. Many of these products include images of opium poppy on the label, others specifically refer to the 
disease and insects that they will counter. As such, products are being tailored to the local environment and 
sold with labels in Dari and Pashto. Some products are named to appeal to the local market such as ‘Gandam 
Kush’ (wheat killer), ‘Cruise’ (as in Cruise Missile) and ‘Zanmargai’ (suicide bomber).
While innovation has been rapid and helped farmers cope with falling opium yields the adoption of new 
technologies is changing the socio-economic composition of these former desert lands The use of herbicides 
is reducing the demand for hired labour during the weeding season as well as the need for hiring labour on a 
sharecropping basis. In Bakwa, there are already signs that the shift to solar technology is reducing the number 
of farmers taking land under the lekha arrangement. Once a solar powered system is installed landlords have 
little interest in hiring sharecroppers only to receive 1/7th of the final crop. This made sense with a diesel pow-
ered deep well given the high recurrent costs but with a solar system landlords can employ sharecroppers, incur 
almost no recurrent costs and receive 4/5ths of the final yield. As an example, a landlord in Bakwa who had three 
diesel powered wells, each worked by a sharecropper under the lekha arrangement for nine years. In the fall of 
2016 this landlord replaced one of these systems with solar technology. In doing so he also hired a sharecropper 
on a 1/5th share to work this land. Overall 65 percent of those employed under a lekha in Bakwa in 2017 had 
a diesel powered deep well compared to the sample as a whole where 68 percent had a solar powered system.
Solar technology is likely to lead to greater levels of socio-economic differentiation and limit the ability of the 
land-poor to purchase desert land in the future, particularly given the frequency of years in which there are low 
opium yields. Those with small landholdings are not able to forego cultivable land to build a reservoir, which 
can be as large as 1,000 square meters; while those with insufficient capital—also the land poor—are unable 
to afford the financial outlay for a solar powered deep well. In the face of this new technology, diesel powered 
wells are too vulnerable to what can be dramatic fluctuations in diesel prices, and too unreliable (and therefore 
costly) due to their tendency to breakdown due to the adulterated diesel used. With the anticipated growth 
in the sale of solar panels in Helmand in the summer of 2017 following a particularly good harvest, the local 
perception is that ‘only the poor who will use diesel powered generators in the future’.
Of course, there is a further potential downside to the uptake of solar technology and that is the impact it 
will have on groundwater. In 2017 farmers already reported that the water table was dropping from 1 to 2 
metres per year, compared to only 0.5 to 1 metre per year prior to the introduction of solar powered deep-
wells. There are growing fears in the former desert areas of both Helmand and Bakwa that the current rate 
of growth in solar powered deepwells will have long-term detrimental effects on agricultural production and 
therefore hamper their ability to remain in the former desert lands they have settled and call home. Given 
the size of the population in these former desert lands and the shortage of agricultural land in the main 
irrigated valleys, it is unclear where these settlers would go were they to experience repeated crop failure 
or were the returns on opium to repeatedly fail to meet production costs. While illegal opium continues to 
provides the means by which farmers can settle new lands, meet their living costs and generate sufficient 
income to pay recurrent costs and innovate, one has to wonder how long it will be before the water runs out.
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6. Conclusion
As this paper has shown, illegal opium has been at the forefront of development and innovation in the for-
mer deserts of southwest Afghanistan. While viewed by the government in Kabul and its donors as marginal, 
remote and ungoverned space, these desert areas have been transformed from a rocky and sandy outcrop on 
the frontier of the Afghan state into engines of growth and a place where those excluded from the kinds of 
development driven by the central state can escape.
The transformation of these former desert areas has been dramatic. In just over a decade over 300,000 hec-
tares of land have come under agricultural production in the southwest of the country alone. This has not 
been at the behest of the kind of state-funded irrigation systems that we have seen in the past in Afghanistan 
but the result of both collective and individual action by farming communities themselves. Initially the 
desert land was captured by local powerbrokers and distributed amongst their supporters. Investment in the 
land itself has been done on an individual basis. Access to improved technology has allowed ground water to 
be exploited. Further advancements and innovations in the form of solar technology and herbicides has sup-
ported farmers to respond to dwindling yields and rising production costs. The illegal opium crop, and the 
price premium that it generated, funded these developments; it has spurred on a process of land settlement 
and agricultural transformation in the frontier that otherwise would not have taken place.
It is possible that with the recent uptake in solar powered technology and herbicides, these former desert 
areas will undergo a further stage of development, one where land and capital is increasingly concentrated 
in the hands of a smaller number of landowners and where there are fewer opportunities for leasing land or 
wage labour opportunities for the land poor. As such, there is a risk that these former deserts areas will no 
longer have the absorptive capacity they once did, and an increasing number of those who once leased or 
sharecropped land north of the Boghra and in Bakwa may return to the villages where they came from. In 
Helmand this is likely to lead to a return to the canal irrigated areas of the districts of Lashkar Gah, Nad-e Ali 
and Marjah, increasing the pressure for these areas to return to widespread opium poppy cultivation once 
again. In Bakwa, those departing may return to Farah district, as well as central Helmand. It would appear 
that for those that wish to see opium poppy cultivation curtailed there is little room for optimism, other 
than a falling water table that could devastate the local economy.
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